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I. Introduction 
The procedures followed by law enforcement after the arrest 
of a suspect are all too familiar. The suspect is read his rights, 
brought to the police station, and “booked,” a process involving 
verification of the suspect’s identity by taking a photograph (the 
“mug shot”) and impressions of the suspect’s fingerprints.1 In 
recent years a new element of the process has emerged—a lab 
technician will appear, don rubber gloves, and take either a blood 
sample or a swab of the inside of the suspect’s cheek, known as a 
buccal swab.2 From this swab, a DNA sample will be extracted, 
the total sample will be narrowed down to so-called “junk” 
strands,3 and the suspect’s DNA profile will be uploaded to the 
state and federal DNA databases.4 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Corey Preston, Note, Faulty Foundations: How the False Analogy to 
Routine Fingerprinting Undermines the Argument for Arrestee DNA Sampling, 
19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 475 & n.1 (2010) (describing the booking 
procedure). Preston’s suggestion of the grim scene from Alfred Hitchcock’s The 
Wrong Man as a popular culture template, id. at 475 n.1, is an excellent choice, 
but for a more lighthearted version of the classic procedure, see MY BLUE 
HEAVEN (Warner Bros. Pictures 1990). 
 2. See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 406–07 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (describing methods of sample extraction). 
 3. See id. at 400–01 (defining junk DNA as “non-genic stretches of DNA 
not presently recognized as being responsible for trait coding” and explaining 
that junk strands are compared to other DNA samples through short tandem 
repeat (STR) technology that provides precise information about identity while 
revealing no traits of the individual). For a more thorough explanation of DNA 
and DNA testing procedures, see Robert W. Schumacher II, Note, Expanding 
New York’s DNA Database: The Future of Law Enforcement, 26 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1635, 1637–44 (1999). 
 4. See People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 757 (Ct. App. 2011) 
(describing how a profile created in a state database is also entered into the 
national Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)). 
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The federal Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) and the 
various state DNA databases initially only contained profiles for 
people convicted of certain qualifying offenses.5 Every court to 
consider the post-conviction DNA extraction statutes has found 
them to be constitutional.6 Recently, the federal statute and 
many state statutes have been amended to allow law enforcement 
to take DNA samples from people arrested for qualifying 
offenses.7 
Challenges to the federal statute have made their way to 
courts of appeals, and those that have considered the statute 
have deemed it constitutional.8 State statutes have by and large 
gone unchallenged, but those state courts considering the issue 
have split.9 Courts have analogized extraction of DNA after 
arrest to extraction of DNA after conviction.10  
Courts to consider DNA extraction statutes consider 
extraction as two separate searches.11 The first search, the 
extraction itself, whether done by blood draw or buccal swab, has 
been deemed minimally intrusive.12 The second search, creation 
of the DNA profile in the database, is more controversial, but 
courts upholding extraction statutes have emphasized that 
arrestees have a reduced reasonable expectation of privacy, 
                                                                                                     
 5. See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 399 (providing history of federal statute). 
 6. See State v. King, 42 A.3d 549, 563 (Md. 2012) (“Courts have upheld 
overwhelmingly against Fourth Amendment challenges federal and state 
statutes authorizing warrantless, suspicionless DNA collection from convicted 
criminals, including incarcerated prisoners, parolees, and probationers.”), cert. 
granted, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 954 (Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-207). 
 7. See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2006) (amended 2006); see, e.g., CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 54-102g (West 2012) (amended 2011). 
 8. See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 415–16 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc); Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012) (upholding the federal 
statute). 
 9. Compare Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 706 (Va. 2007) 
(upholding state arrestee extraction statute), with In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 
N.W.2d 484, 492 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006), Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 782–83, King, 
42 A.3d at 580, and Mario W. v. Kaipio, 281 P.3d 476, 483 (Ariz. 2012) (striking 
down state arrestee extraction statutes). 
 10. See, e.g., Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 403–05. 
 11. See, e.g., Haskell, 669 F.3d at 1058 (explaining the first search is the 
“physical collection of the DNA,” the second is the “analysis of the information 
contained in the sample”). 
 12. See, e.g., Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 407. 
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database profiles contain only information that can be used to 
determine the identity the arrestee, and the penalties for 
improper disclosure of information in the database are stiff.13 
These courts support their argument by comparing DNA 
extraction to taking fingerprints and photographs—traditional 
booking procedures—finding it is merely a more efficient, 
foolproof way to serve the same interests in identifying the 
arrestee and establishing a baseline for the rest of the process.14 
The DNA databases have been found to be powerful law 
enforcement tools, and courts have concluded the interests of the 
government outweigh the interests of the individual.15 
Recently, however, a powerful opposing viewpoint has 
emerged that would find these statutes unconstitutional.16 This 
line of reasoning holds there are significant differences between 
extraction of DNA post-arrest and post-conviction, so the 
constitutionality of post-conviction extraction should not be a 
factor in evaluating post-arrest statutes.17 Post-arrest statutes 
impose significant burdens on an arrestee, one who has not yet 
been found guilty of any crime, let alone a qualifying offense. 
Many statutes allow law enforcement to use all necessary force to 
obtain the sample, and many also make it a crime not to 
cooperate in providing a sample.18 While every statute provides a 
procedure for expungement, some of these procedures are 
onerous, and virtually all statutes provide that if an arrestee is 
not convicted, but his profile is not expunged and a hit in the 
database leads to a future arrest, that arrest is not invalid 
because the profile should not have been in the database.19 
Finally, in the not-too-distant future, even junk DNA could be 
                                                                                                     
 13. See, e.g., id. at 406–15. 
 14. See, e.g., id. at 413–15. 
 15. See, e.g., id. at 415–16. 
 16. See, e.g., People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 782–83 (Ct. App. 2011). 
 17. See, e.g., id. 
 18. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102g(i), (j) (West 2012) (making 
refusal to cooperate a class D felony and allowing use of reasonable force to 
extract samples). 
 19. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 44.41.035(i), (q) (West 2012) (requiring 
arrestee to submit certified copy of court order showing charges did not result in 
conviction for qualifying offense to expunge record and providing that matches 
to database profiles kept in good faith are admissible against arrestee). 
YOU’RE UNDER ARREST 1447 
mined for all kinds of information beyond an arrestee’s identity, 
potentially giving the government a wealth of information from 
someone who has yet to be found guilty.20 For these judges, these 
factors tip the scales toward unconstitutionality. 
This Note examines individual state statutes and the federal 
statute to see what elements legislatures might want to include 
in their statutes and what elements they might want to exclude 
in order to insulate their statutes from constitutional challenge 
and continue to provide law enforcement with a valuable 
investigatory tool. 
II. Similarities and Differences Among Federal and State DNA 
Extraction Statutes 
A. The Federal Statute 
In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act,21 which authorized the FBI to create CODIS. In 
the 2000 DNA Act,22 Congress required the extraction of a DNA 
sample and creation of a profile in CODIS for anyone convicted of 
a qualifying federal offense. In 2006 Congress amended the DNA 
Act, mandating the extraction of DNA from anyone arrested for a 
qualifying federal offense.23 
The DNA Act allows for collection of DNA from any 
individual, including juveniles, arrested for a qualifying offense.24 
Qualifying offenses include any felony, misdemeanor sex crimes 
and crimes of violence, and any attempt or conspiracy to commit 
a qualifying offense.25 
The Act allows “use of such means as are reasonably 
necessary to detain, restrain, and collect a DNA sample from an 
                                                                                                     
 20. See Ashley Eiler, Note, Arrested Development: Reforming the Federal 
All-Arrestee DNA Collection Statute to Comply with the Fourth Amendment, 79 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1201, 1211 (2011) (“[A]s technology inevitably advances, 
scientists have predicted that even junk DNA will allow access to the wealth of 
information that an individual’s DNA contains.”).  
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 13701 (2006). 
 22. Id. § 14135a (2000). 
 23. Id. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. § 14135a(d). 
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individual who refuses to cooperate in the collection of the 
sample.”26 Refusal to cooperate is a misdemeanor.27 Expungement 
is available for an arrestee who was not convicted of a qualifying 
offense if the arrestee sends the FBI a copy of the final court 
order disposing of the case.28 
Based on the above, the DNA Act is a relatively unforgiving 
DNA extraction statute. It implicates many of the concerns 
identified by the courts that find post-arrest extraction statutes 
unconstitutional. First, it has a broad scope, extending beyond 
felonies to include non-sex crime misdemeanors, and to juveniles 
as well as adults.29 Second, it authorizes use of reasonable force 
and criminalizes refusal to cooperate, creating significant 
immediate and future consequences for refusal to give a sample.30 
Third, expungement procedures place a substantial burden on the 
arrestee.31 The arrestee needs to understand that the profile was 
created and needs to be expunged, a detail that can be easily lost 
in the swirl of criminal proceedings and the relief of not being 
convicted. Even if the arrestee understands the profile needs to 
be expunged, he must work with his lawyer or go to the 
courthouse to get a copy of his final order, determine where it 
needs to be sent, and send it to the FBI. 
B. State Statutes 
Different states have adopted many different frameworks for 
extraction of DNA from those who have been arrested for or 
convicted of qualifying offenses. This Note analyzes the statutes 
based on the factors highlighted by those who view the statutes 
                                                                                                     
 26. Id. § 14135a(a)(4)(A). 
 27. Id. § 14135a(a)(5). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
 29. See id. § 14135a(d)(3) (defining qualifying offenses to include 
misdemeanor crimes of violence); id. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) (authorizing collection of 
samples from all individuals, not merely adults). 
 30. See id. § 14135a(a)(4) (authorizing use of reasonable force); id. 
§ 14135a(a)(5) (criminalizing refusal to cooperate). 
 31. See id. § 14132 (detailing expungement procedures); see also United 
States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 420 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Rendell, J., 
dissenting) (explaining the many steps in the process of expungement under 
§ 14132). 
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as unconstitutional, attempting to describe the approach taken by 
the majority of states, any significant minority approaches, and 
any novel solutions undertaken by individual states. 
1. From Whom Can DNA Be Extracted? 
Twenty-three states do not allow DNA to be taken at the 
time of arrest, requiring DNA to be taken only after the arrestee 
is convicted of a qualifying offense.32 Of those twenty-three, 
fifteen have current or recently proposed legislation to expand the 
scope of their DNA extraction statutes to cover arrestees.33  
Oklahoma is an outlier between the camps of states that do 
or do not allow extraction at the time of arrest. Oklahoma allows 
DNA taken at the time of arrest only from illegal aliens.34 
Oklahoma has recently proposed legislation to increase the scope 
of DNA collection to U.S. citizen arrestees as well.35  
Of the twenty-six other states that allow a DNA sample to be 
taken at the time of arrest, only eight states allow a DNA sample 
                                                                                                     
 32. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4713(b) (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 35-
3-160(b) (West 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 844D-31 (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 19-5506(a) (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-13-6-10 (West 2012); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 81.2 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.170(2)(a) (West 2012); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1574 (2011.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22E, § 3 (West 
2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.176 (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-37 
(West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-6-103 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-
4106 (LexisNexis 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.0913 (West 2011); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 651-C:2 (2013); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-c(3) (McKinney 2012); OR. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 181.085 (West 2012); 44 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 2316 (West 
2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-1.5-1 (West 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 43.43.754 (West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2B-6 (West 2012); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 165.77 (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-403 (West 2012). 
 33. See H.B. 132, 26th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2011); S.B. 35, 117th Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011); H.B. 314, Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2012); H.P. 849, 
125th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2011); S.B. 835, 187th Gen. Court (Mass. 2011); 
S.B. 1345, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2012); A.B. 552, 76th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 
2011); S.B. 2857, 234th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011); S.B. 811, 76th Leg. Assemb. (Or. 
2011); S.B. 150, 197th Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2013); S.B. 41, Leg. Sess. (R.I. 2013); 
H.B. 1369, 62nd Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Wash. 2011); H.B. 2867, 80th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (W. Va. 2012); S.B. 214, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2011); H.B. 204, 62nd 
Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013). 
 34. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 150.27a(A) (West 2012). 
 35. See S.B. 851, 53rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2011).  
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to be taken from adults.36 Among states that differentiate 
between adults and juveniles, Utah has the lowest floor for what 
age is appropriate to take a sample, extracting DNA from anyone 
over fourteen years of age who is arrested for a qualifying 
offense.37 No statutes treat juvenile samples or profiles differently 
than adult samples or profiles. 
In terms of what offenses qualify for post-arrest extraction, 
every state has its own unique compilation, with each state 
drawing a different line for what offenses are serious enough to 
warrant processing a sample and comparing it to the database. 
Some states enumerate certain felonies for which DNA can be 
extracted at the time of arrest.38 Other states draw the line at 
felonies, but only felonies.39 The states that draw the line further 
down, allowing extraction at the time of arrest for misdemeanors, 
typically choose misdemeanor sex crimes or crimes of violence as 
qualifying offenses.40 
2. What “Encouragement” Is Provided to Ensure Collection? 
Many states have confronted the problem of an arrestee who 
reacts with skepticism to the extraction of a DNA sample as a 
new part of post-arrest procedures. Twelve states follow the 
federal statute’s lead and allow authorities to use reasonable 
force to extract a sample.41 Reasonable force covers all kinds of 
                                                                                                     
 36. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 296(a)(2) (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 16-23-103(1)(a) (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 650.055(1)(2) (West 2012); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 29-16-6(B) (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 31-13-03(1) (West); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07(B)(1) (West 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-620(A) 
(2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5A-5.2 (2012). 
 37. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-10-403 (West 2012). 
 38. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1006(a)(2) (West 2012) (limiting DNA 
extraction to first-degree murder, kidnapping, rape, and felony sexual assault). 
 39. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-23-103(1)(a) (West 2012). 
 40. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-610(O)(3) (2012) (including as 
qualifying offenses misdemeanor prostitution and indecent exposure); MD. CODE 
ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(a)(3)(i) (West 2012) (including as a qualifying offense 
“any crime of violence”). 
 41. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 44.41.035(n) (West 2012); ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 12-12-1006(k)(1); CAL. PENAL CODE § 298.1(b)(1); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-
23-103(5); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102g(j) (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 943.325(8) (West 2012); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-4-3(i)(1) (West 2012); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:609(I) (2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 650.055(3); S.D. 
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activity. In one case, a suspect in a holding cell, shackled and 
chained to a metal bar, declined to give a DNA sample, and a 
detective warned the suspect he could “get hurt pretty bad” before 
he “forced [the suspect’s] jaw open and forcefully took a buccal 
swab.”42 Most states allow the person taking the sample to judge 
when force should be used and what amount is necessary, but two 
states go an extra step to make sure force is necessary before it is 
used.43 
Vermont injects additional due process into the use of force 
by initially allowing the arrestee to refuse to provide a sample.44 
If the arresting agency wants a sample taken before trial, it must 
seek a court order.45 The arrestee is entitled to a hearing, at 
which time a judge decides whether a sample is required and can 
authorize reasonable force.46 
California provides an elaborate framework for the use of 
reasonable force, defining it as the “force an objective and trained 
corrections officer would use in the circumstances,” requiring 
written authorization from a supervising officer before force can 
be used, and providing that if force is used outside the arrestee’s 
cell, it must be video recorded.47 Both procedures have elements 
that could prove cumbersome. Both procedures, however, would 
placate those who fear giving police a blank check to use 
reasonable force in any situation, force that could easily be used 
to intimidate an innocent suspect or as a vehicle for 
discrimination.48 
Several states offer additional “encouragement” to cooperate 
by making refusal to cooperate a crime. Four states follow the 
federal government and have made refusal to cooperate a 
                                                                                                     
CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5A-13; UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-10-404(3)(c); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 20, § 1935 (West). 
 42. Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 43. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1935(a); CAL. PENAL CODE § 298.1(c) (West 
2012). 
 44. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1935(a). 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. § 1935(b), (c). 
 47. CAL. PENAL CODE § 298.1(c). 
 48. Cf. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 372 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“[U]nbounded discretion carries with it grave potential for abuse.”). 
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misdemeanor,49 and three states have made refusal to cooperate a 
felony.50 With the exception of Kansas, all states that make 
refusal to give a sample a crime, like the federal government, use 
both reasonable force and threat of an additional charge to ensure 
cooperation.51 Kansas also requires the arrestee to be given notice 
that it is a crime to refuse to provide a sample before the 
additional charge can be brought.52 On a day-to-day level, notice 
is probably provided to most arrestees to achieve cooperation, but 
a statutory requirement is a good idea, again to ensure maximum 
protection for the rights of arrestees while still allowing law 
enforcement to take DNA. 
3. When Can the Sample Be Taken? 
Another facet of state DNA extraction statutes that varies 
from state to state is the provision governing when the sample is 
taken.53 This small detail could have significant repercussions for 
arrestees. Despite the best efforts of law enforcement, some 
arrests are chaotic, or are designed to find out what a person of 
interest knows, or are made by mistake. In most cases, mistaken 
arrests are quickly cleared up, but the effects could linger if DNA 
is taken right away, as now the arrestee, despite having done 
nothing that would constitute probable cause to support the 
arrest, has been forced to give a potential wealth of information 
to the state. All states have procedures in place to expunge a 
database record and destroy the sample if charges are never 
brought, but many depend on the arrestee to start the process.54 
                                                                                                     
 49. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1006(i) (West 2012); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 298.1(a) (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325(15)(a) (West 2012); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-2511(m) (West 2012). 
 50. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102g(i) (West 2012); 730 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. § 5/5-4-3(i)(1) (West 2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5A-14 (2012). 
 51. See supra notes 41, 49–50 and accompanying text (listing Arkansas, 
California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, and South Dakota as states that allow 
both reasonable force and criminalize refusal to cooperate). 
 52. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511(m). 
 53. Compare, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-18-25(c)(1) (2012) (allowing DNA to be 
taken at the time of booking), with MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(b)(1) 
(West 2012) (requiring law enforcement to wait until probable cause 
determination has been made to take a sample). 
 54. Discussed in greater detail in Part II.B.4, infra.  
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If a mistakenly arrested person walks out of the county jail 
breathing a sigh of relief that the mix-up has been sorted out and 
wanting nothing more to do with it, he could easily forget to 
initiate the expungement process. Thus, his record would be left 
in the system to perhaps be used against him at a later date, 
when police haul him in for questioning as part of a future 
investigation with which he is tangentially involved through 
DNA. 
Fifteen state statutes, like the federal statute, explicitly 
allow for DNA to be taken at the time of booking.55 Allowing a 
sample to be taken at this stage of the process presents the 
maximum risk for the state to gain information with potentially 
no justification in the case of a mistaken arrest. Seven states 
wait, choosing to take the sample after law enforcement has 
demonstrated probable cause for the arrest.56 Waiting for a 
probable cause determination minimizes the risk to individuals of 
divulging information to the state without proper justification, 
and the state gets the DNA profiles for those truly deserving of 
being in the database pending trial. 
4. What Are the Procedures for Expungement? 
Expungement procedures are like qualifying offenses—there 
are many variables for state legislatures to consider when 
drafting legislation, so procedures vary from state to state. The 
most common procedure for expungement among states is the 
procedure adopted by the federal statute, which places the 
                                                                                                     
 55. See ALA. CODE § 36-18-25(c)(1); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-610(K) 
(2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1006(a)(2) (West 2012); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 297(a)(1)(A) (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-23-103(1)(a) (West 2012); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102g(a); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325(3)(a) (West 
2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511(e)(2) (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 15:609(A)(1) (2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 650.055(2)(1) (West 2012); N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. § 31-13-03(1) (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07(B)(1) 
(West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-620(A) (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5A-
5.2; UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-10-403 (West 2012). 
 56. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-4-3(a-3.2) (West 2012); MD. CODE 
ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(b)(1); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.105(1)(a)(1) (West 
2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-266.3A(b) (West 2012); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§ 411.1471(a)(1) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1933(a)(2) (West 2012); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2:1 (West 2012). 
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burden on the arrestee to obtain a copy of a final order of 
dismissal of charges, nolle prosequi, acquittal at trial, conviction 
of a lesser, non-qualifying offense, or reversal of conviction, and 
mail that order to the state agency charged with maintaining the 
state DNA database.57 The agency is then charged with promptly 
deleting the arrestee’s profile in its database and contacting the 
FBI to make sure the profile is deleted from CODIS.58 Thirteen 
states that allow post-arrest DNA extraction employ such 
procedures.59 
Two states have unique expungement procedures that take 
novel approaches to lessen the burden on arrestees. Instead of 
placing the burden on the arrestee to make sure the profile is 
expunged if charges are not filed, Colorado places the burden on 
the district attorney’s office to make sure the sample stays in the 
system.60 If charges are filed and the arrestee is not convicted, 
Colorado does not require that the person obtain a copy of the 
final court order; it only requires the arrestee to submit basic 
information and “[a] declaration that, to the best of the person’s 
knowledge, he or she qualifies for expungement.”61 Once the state 
bureau of investigation receives this request, Colorado once again 
shifts the burden to the district attorney—the bureau contacts 
the district attorney to see if the arrestee, in fact, does not qualify 
for expungement, and if the district attorney fails to reply within 
ninety days, the profile is expunged.62 
Colorado provides notice to the arrestee to either confirm 
that the sample was destroyed or provide reasons why it was not 
                                                                                                     
 57. See 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d) (2006) (detailing the procedure for 
expungement under the federal statute). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See ALA. CODE § 36-18-26 (2012); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 44.41.035(i) 
(West 2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-610(M); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1019 
(West 2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 299 (West 2012); CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. § 54-
102l (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325(16); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
§ 5/5-4-3(f-1); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511(e)(4)–(5); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:614; 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-16-10 (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 31-13-07; S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5A-29. 
 60. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-23-104 (“If the Colorado bureau of 
investigation does not receive confirmation of a felony charge within a year after 
receiving the sample for testing, the Colorado bureau of investigation shall 
destroy the biological sample and any results from the testing of the sample.”). 
 61. Id. § 16-23-105(2). 
 62. Id. § 16-23-105(3)–(4). 
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destroyed.63 This frees the arrestee from the burden of following 
up with the state agency to make sure the profile was destroyed, 
consequently the arrestee does not need to worry about 
subsequent arrest if his DNA is present at a future crime scene. 
Finally, the statute provides that if a future arrest is based on a 
DNA match in the database and the profile should have been 
expunged or is scheduled for expungement, the match is not 
admissible as evidence at the arrestee’s trial.64 
Maryland’s extraction statute provides “[a]t the time of 
collection of the DNA sample . . . the individual from whom a 
sample is collected shall be given notice that the DNA record may 
be expunged and the DNA sample destroyed in accordance with 
[statutory expungement procedures].”65 Three other states have 
joined Maryland in providing notice about expungement 
procedures to the arrestee at the outset.66 This element of the 
procedure will make sure the arrestee is fully aware of how to go 
about getting the profile expunged if he is not subsequently 
convicted. This is different from procedures in other states, which 
require an arrestee to be proactive to determine what records 
were made and how they should be expunged. 
Maryland also provides that the sample will be destroyed 
automatically whenever the prosecution ends: “If all qualifying 
charges are determined to be unsupported by probable cause: the 
DNA sample shall be immediately destroyed . . . .”67 The statute 
provides that the same will happen if trial does not result in 
conviction, if the conviction is overturned, or if the arrestee is 
unconditionally pardoned.68 Maryland, like Colorado, is one of the 
few states that sends notice to the arrestee and his lawyer to 
confirm expungement.69 
Both Maryland and Colorado place the burden on the state, 
not the arrestee, to expunge database records and destroy DNA 
samples. This seems like the most important process of any 
                                                                                                     
 63. Id. § 16-23-105(5). 
 64. Id. § 16-23-105(6). 
 65. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(a)(3)(ii) (West 2012). 
 66. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-23-103(2)(a) (West 2012); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 15A-266.3A(d) (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-660(E) (2012). 
 67. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(d)(2)(i). 
 68. Id. § 2-511(a)(1). 
 69. Id. § 2-511(e). 
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expungement procedure that would satisfy the courts contending 
that post-arrest DNA extraction is unconstitutional. Several 
states have similar procedures,70 and the fact that this element is 
widely adopted backs up the common-sense intuition that it is not 
a major burden to put on the court or the prosecutor, who will 
become used to dealing with the appropriate state agencies and 
can get records expunged quickly and easily. Arrestees, on the 
other hand, will be navigating the system infrequently at worst, 
with little knowledge of its inner workings. 
California, which protects arrestees with its intricate 
procedures governing the use of reasonable force, also has some of 
the most exacting procedures for expunging a record. This 
increases the burden on an arrestee eventually not found guilty of 
a qualifying offense. Whereas most states only require the 
arrestee to contact the state agency responsible for the state DNA 
database, California requires the arrestee to contact, in writing, 
the trial court, the state Department of Justice (which 
administers the state database), and the prosecutor on the 
arrestee’s case.71 Not only does the arrestee have to write to three 
different places, but he is also required to obtain proof of service 
on all three.72 While other states require just a certified copy of 
the document memorializing the final disposition of the arrestee’s 
case, California requires that document, plus proof of service on 
the other named departments, and a separate court order 
verifying that there is no appeal pending or objection to 
expungement by the Department of Justice or the prosecutor.73 
The worry with the expungement procedure employed by the 
federal government and most states (arrestee must start process 
and submit certified copy of document) is that the arrestee will 
not know to do it, and that it will be somewhat inconvenient. The 
worry with a system as demanding as California’s is that an 
arrestee could be fully apprised of the procedure and decide it is 
                                                                                                     
 70. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.105(3)(a) (West 2012) (requiring 
arrestee to initiate process if charges were dismissed, but providing for 
automatic expungement if arrestee is found not guilty); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 15A-266.3A(i) (moving burden from arrestee to prosecutor and court effective 
June 2012). 
 71. CAL. PENAL CODE § 299(c)(1) (West 2012). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. § 299(c)(2). 
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not worth the time, especially the onerous requirements of 
securing proof of service and having to follow up with busy courts 
to get a second court order. 
5. Other Notable Features of State Systems 
Individual states, being the great laboratories for 
experimentation that they are, have also come up with unique 
facets of their statutory schemes that defy easy categorization but 
deserve special attention for their novel approaches to some of 
the issues outlined above. 
One of the most interesting approaches taken by any state is 
that of Alabama, which gives arrestees the absolute right to 
refuse to give a sample:  
[A]ny person arrested for a felony offense . . . shall consent in 
writing freely and voluntarily to provide a DNA sample and 
shall be informed that they are providing written permission 
without any threats or promises. The person shall have the 
right to refuse to provide a sample . . . without penalty. The 
refusal may not be used as evidence against the person in any 
proceeding.74 
This is perhaps the ultimate arrestee protection because the 
arrestee has the choice of whether to provide any information to 
the state through a DNA sample. This measure, however, exalts 
the rights of arrestees over the legitimate needs of law 
enforcement. Any arrestee wise to this part of the statute will 
decline to give a sample, denying law enforcement potentially 
valuable information concerning the identity and history of the 
arrestee. 
Connecticut sharply limits the pool of arrestees from whom it 
can take DNA samples by requiring that the arrestee be arrested 
for a qualifying offense and have a prior felony conviction before a 
sample can be taken.75 Texas has a similar statute—DNA can 
only be taken at the time of arrest from an arrestee who has 
previously been convicted of a qualifying offense.76 This is an 
                                                                                                     
 74. ALA. CODE § 36-18-25(c)(3) (2012). 
 75. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102g(a) (West 2012). 
 76. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.1471(a)(2) (West 2011) (allowing for 
samples to be taken at time of arrest from an arrestee who has already been 
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effective way to target repeat offenders, and thus increases the 
likelihood of connection to other open investigations and 
maximum usefulness of extraction. The guarantee of increased 
effectiveness, however, comes at too high a price. Repeat 
criminals savvy enough to avoid arrest or conviction for prior 
crimes may only be able to be linked to prior crimes by DNA, and 
the Connecticut statute would allow them to potentially continue 
to elude responsibility for prior crimes. 
A persistent theme cropping up in many state statutes is the 
presence of various allusions to funding. Many DNA statutes 
were passed years ago, when states were more financially sound, 
and even then statewide DNA databases were considered a 
luxury, to be maintained if funding was available. The recent 
economic downturn has left many state budgets in dire straits, 
and programs like DNA databases are now more of a luxury than 
ever. Florida explicitly provides how funding will affect extraction 
of DNA from arrestees: “DNA samples collected . . . from persons 
arrested for any felony offense or attempted felony offense in this 
state are subject to sufficient funding appropriations passed by 
the Legislature and approved by the Governor . . . .”77 The statute 
then provides a schedule, starting in 2011 with certain categories 
of felonies (homicide, assault, sexual battery, lewdness) and 
expanding as funding allows with the ultimate goal of covering all 
felonies by 2019.78 A clear tension exists in every state between a 
security-conscious desire to use DNA to catch serious offenders 
and keep them off the streets and a budget-conscious desire to 
spend money in other pressing (and potentially crime-preventing) 
areas like education, healthcare, and unemployment assistance. 
Some states have attempted to bolster their bottom line by 
soliciting contributions from the arrestees themselves. One state, 
Utah, makes the arrestee pay $150 as the cost of collection at the 
time the sample is taken, unless the court finds the arrestee 
indigent and unable to pay.79 Several other states loan the 
arrestee the cost of the extraction and collect if the arrestee is 
                                                                                                     
convicted of an enumerated felony). DNA is taken at indictment for those 
arrested for enumerated felonies without a prior conviction. Id. § 411.1471(a)(1). 
 77. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325(3)(b) (West 2012). 
 78. Id. 
 79. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-10-404(2)(a) (West 2012). 
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convicted.80 The Utah method is an invitation to stoke the fires of 
those who would see all arrestee extraction statutes found 
unconstitutional. Nothing would gall those who see post-arrest 
extraction as an unconstitutional invasion of privacy more than 
not only having one’s privacy invaded, but also having to pay the 
state for the privilege. While forcing a convicted arrestee to 
compensate the state for extraction and creation of a profile is on 
less slippery ground constitutionally, it still smacks of unfairness. 
Budget-conscious states seeking to maintain a valuable law 
enforcement tool in the face of fiscal realities will have to make 
many tough choices, one of which is whether to try to collect from 
convicted arrestees, taking not only their freedom but also 
various administrative costs of convicting them and keeping an 
eye on them after they are released. 
III. Constitutional Challenges to Federal and State Statutes 
Many arrestees have challenged the constitutionality of 
federal and state statutes relied on by law enforcement personnel 
to take a DNA sample before conviction and enter it into CODIS 
or a state database. These challenges have engendered a sharp 
divide between judges. Although the federal statute has been 
upheld by every court to consider it, it has been upheld by divided 
courts and over sharp dissents.81 Challenges on the state level 
have been more successful, with four state courts invalidating 
regimes in their respective states.82 The opinions to date have 
provided a road map of the different viewpoints on what makes 
DNA extraction from arrestees constitutional. By understanding 
the issues on which supporters and critics of the statutes agree 
and disagree, a legislature can better understand how to 
immunize a statute from constitutional challenge and continue to 
                                                                                                     
 80. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325(12)(a); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 31-
13-03(3) (West 2011). 
 81. See Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 
1213 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated as moot, 659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 82. See Mario W. v. Kaipio, 281 P.3d 476 (Ariz. 2012); People v. Buza, 129 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Ct. App. 2011); King v. State, 42 A.3d 549 (Md. 2012); In re 
Welfare of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). 
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provide a valuable tool to law enforcement while still protecting 
the rights of arrestees.83 
The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to 
be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”84 All courts to consider DNA 
extraction from arrestees agree that it involves two separate 
searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. These searches 
are evaluated under a totality of the circumstances test, 
balancing interests of the individual against government 
interests, and if government interests prevail, the search is 
reasonable and thus constitutional.85 The first search is the 
extraction of the sample itself, and it is constitutional because 
“the intrusion occasioned by the act of collecting the DNA sample 
is minimal.”86 It is the second search, “the processing of the DNA 
sample and the creation of the DNA profile for [the database]” 
that courts have had to analyze more closely.87 
Four major points of disagreement have emerged. First, 
courts differ as to whether an arrestee is more like a convict, with 
a reduced reasonable expectation of privacy, or more like a 
normal citizen, with a full reasonable expectation of privacy.  
Second, courts disagree over how similar DNA extraction is to 
accepted booking procedures of taking fingerprints and 
photographs. Third, courts have placed different weight on the 
availability of expungement and whether it means extraction at 
arrest is constitutional or unconstitutional. Finally, courts have 
differed over the use of reasonable force and the role it plays in 
Fourth Amendment analysis. 
                                                                                                     
 83. The U.S. Supreme Court is about to weigh in as well. It has granted 
certiorari in Maryland v. King and will hopefully provide definitive guidance to 
states on exactly what is required for an extraction statute to be constitutional 
under the Fourth Amendment. King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, cert. granted, 
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-207). 
 84. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 85. See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 402 (outlining the totality of the 
circumstances test). 
 86. See, e.g., id. at 407. 
 87. Id. 
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A. The Analogy Between DNA Extraction from People Arrested for 
Qualifying Offenses and People Convicted of Qualifying Offenses 
In United States v. Mitchell,88 a majority of the Third Circuit, 
sitting en banc, began its analysis by looking to cases upholding 
DNA extraction following conviction.89 The majority’s analysis 
was shaped by the fact that both the Third Circuit and all the 
other circuits had “concluded that the collection of DNA samples 
from prisoners or probationers is a reasonable search consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment.”90 The majority reasoned that while 
extraction of DNA from an ordinary citizen would be 
unreasonable, extraction from convicted felons was reasonable 
because felons have “a reduced expectation of privacy—and in 
particular privacy of identity.”91 The majority found arrestees had 
similarly reduced expectations of privacy, and held the search of 
creating a database profile for arrestees was reasonable.92 A 
                                                                                                     
 88. See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 415–16 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (holding the DNA Act, as amended to allow DNA extraction from felony 
arrestees, is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment). In Mitchell, the court 
considered the constitutionality of the expanded federal DNA Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14135a, which allows extraction of a DNA sample from any adult or juvenile 
arrested for a felony and certain other qualifying offenses, and the use of that 
sample to create a DNA profile in CODIS. Id. at 401. Mitchell had been arrested 
for attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Id. at 390. Although 
the statute authorizes the arresting agency to take a sample at the time of 
arrest, in this case the prosecutor waited until Mitchell’s initial appearance in 
court to announce his intention to collect a DNA sample. Id. Mitchell objected, 
and the district court, following briefing on the issue, found the statute 
unconstitutional. Id. The Third Circuit majority reasoned that the collection of 
DNA and creation of a profile had already been deemed minimally intrusive in 
the case of people convicted of qualifying offenses, and analogized the collection 
of a sample at the time of booking to the taking of fingerprints, making the 
interests of the arrestee minimal. Id. at 407, 413. The majority found the 
government has a compelling interest in collecting DNA from arrestees and 
creating database profiles, so it concluded, given the totality of the 
circumstances, that the Act is constitutional. Id. at 415–16. 
 89. Id. at 403. 
 90. Id. at 404–05. 
 91. Id. at 404 (quoting United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d 
Cir. 2005)); see also Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 863 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(Callahan, J., dissenting) (“Once an individual is lawfully arrested based upon 
probable cause, his identification becomes a matter of legitimate state interest, 
and he cannot claim privacy in it.”). 
 92. Id. at 416 (“[G]iven arrestees’ . . . diminished expectations of privacy in 
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Ninth Circuit majority in Haskell v. Harris93 reached the same 
result.  The Haskell majority noted there is universal agreement 
that felony arrestees have diminished privacy expectations, and 
noted a statute that allowed police to take DNA from citizens at 
random would be unconstitutional, but a statute allowing for 
extraction of DNA from felony arrestees after police determined 
there was probable cause was constitutional.94 
In United States v. Pool,95 the majority found that whether 
DNA is collected after conviction or after a probable cause 
determination, the “government’s interests remain substantial.”96 
The Pool majority explained that even though the arrestee had 
yet to be convicted, the government had an interest in protecting 
society and ensuring compliance with conditions of pretrial 
release in the “lengthy period of time between an initial 
determination of probable cause and a person’s trial (and even 
more time before a conviction becomes final after an unsuccessful 
appeal).”97 The proposition that arrestees have a lowered 
reasonable expectation of privacy than ordinary citizens finds 
support in Supreme Court precedent: “If the arrest is lawful, the 
privacy interest guarded by the Fourth Amendment is 
subordinated to a legitimate and overriding governmental 
concern.”98 
                                                                                                     
their identities and the Government’s legitimate interests in the collection of 
DNA from these individuals, we conclude that such collection is reasonable and 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 93. See Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 94. See id. at 1058–61. 
 95. See United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1228 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(upholding extraction of DNA from arrestees pursuant to the federal statute 
after a finding of probable cause), vacated as moot, 659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011). 
In Pool, a Ninth Circuit panel considered the constitutionality of the DNA Act 
allowing DNA extraction from those arrested for qualifying offenses. Id at 1214–
15. Pool was arrested on child pornography charges, and consented to all 
conditions of pre-trial release at arraignment except giving a DNA sample. Id. 
at 1215. The magistrate upheld the Act, and the court affirmed, finding under a 
totality of the circumstances that while Pool raised “non-frivolous concerns,” the 
interests of the government in identifying those arrested for qualifying offenses 
outweighs the individual’s privacy interest in his identity. Id. at 1228. 
 96. Id. at 1222–23. 
 97. Id. at 1223. 
 98. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 260 (1973) (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
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Some courts have found the analogy between convicted 
offenders and arrestees far less convincing. In People v. Buza,99 a 
unanimous panel of the California Court of Appeals invalidated 
California’s DNA extraction statute, distinguishing Mitchell and 
Pool because those cases both dealt with DNA extraction after a 
judicial determination of probable cause, while the case before it 
involved extraction at the time of booking.100 The concurring 
opinion in Pool was careful to note this distinction as well, 
explaining “this case condones DNA testing for individuals for 
whom a judicial or grand jury determination has been made; it 
does not address such sampling from mere arrestees.”101 The 
Buza court emphasized that unanimous approval by circuit 
courts of DNA extraction from individuals convicted of qualifying 
offenses was not quite the ringing endorsement proponents like 
the Mitchell majority claimed because those cases “generated 
significant debate and disagreement among the judges that 
decided them.”102 
The Maryland Court of Appeals weighed in decisively, 
finding that the privacy interest of arrestees is greater than that 
of convicted felons in King v. State.103 
                                                                                                     
 99. See People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 783 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding 
the California DNA extraction statute unconstitutional to the extent it requires 
arrestees to submit a DNA sample before a determination of probable cause by a 
judge or grand jury). In Buza, the court considered the constitutionality of the 
California DNA extraction statute, which requires that a sample be taken from 
an individual arrested for a qualifying offense “as soon as administratively 
practicable,” normally at booking. Id. at 756–57. Buza was arrested for arson, a 
qualifying offense under California law, but he refused to provide a DNA sample 
in jail after his arrest. Id. at 755. Buza was charged with a misdemeanor for 
failing to provide a sample, and he challenged his subsequent conviction on the 
grounds the statute was unconstitutional. Id. The court agreed and found 
individual interests outweighed state interests in this case and DNA extraction 
from arrestees without individualized suspicion or a judicial determination of 
probable cause was unreasonable. Id. at 783. In Haskell, the Ninth Circuit panel 
also considered the California extraction statute, and the majority distinguished 
Buza and found the statute constitutional. Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 
1054 n.2, 1065 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 100. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 766. 
 101. United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1231 (9th Cir. 2010) (Lucero, J., 
concurring). 
 102. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 762. 
 103. King v. State, 42 A.3d 549 (Md. 2012). 
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The State underestimates . . . the power of a conviction. . . . 
[C]onvicted felons have a “severely reduced expectation of 
privacy”; the difference regarding a mere arrestee is critical 
here. Although arrestees do not have all the expectations of 
privacy enjoyed by the general public, the presumption of 
innocence bestows on them greater protections than convicted 
felons, parolees, or probationers. A judicial determination of 
criminality, conducted properly, changes drastically an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. . . . This right 
should not be abrogated by the mere charging with a criminal 
offense: the arrestee’s presumption of innocence remains.104 
The dissents in both Mitchell and Pool also disagreed 
strongly with the analogy drawn by the respective majorities. The 
Mitchell dissent stated simply that “[c]onvicts . . . differ from 
arrestees and pretrial detainees in an obvious, but nonetheless 
critical, respect: they have been found guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt, not just accused, of a crime.”105 The Mitchell dissent 
conceded that privacy interests of arrestees are “diminished in 
certain, very circumscribed situations,” but argued those 
interests are “not so weak as to permit the Government to 
intrude into their bodies and extract the highly sensitive 
information coded in their genes.”106 The dissenting judge in Pool 
also put his position in no uncertain terms: “If there was, as the 
majority describes, a ‘watershed event’ that justified what would 
otherwise be an unconstitutional seizure, the event was a 
conviction, not a post-arrest probable cause determination.”107 
This line of reasoning could also find support in Supreme Court 
precedent.108 
                                                                                                     
 104. Id. at 577. The dissent in King, however, countered the majority’s 
assertion about the effect of extraction at arrest on the presumption of 
innocence, noting the arrestees, while presumed innocent, are subject to all 
manner of lawful intrusions. See id. at 582–83 (Barbera, J., dissenting). 
 105. United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 421 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(Rendell, J, dissenting). 
 106. Id. 
 107. United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1236 (9th Cir. 2010) (Schroeder, 
J., dissenting). For a similarly bright line, see In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 
N.W.2d 484, 491–92 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (“And because a person who has been 
charged is innocent until proven guilty, we see no basis in concluding that 
before being convicted, a charged person’s privacy expectation is different from 
the privacy expectations of a person who was charged but the charge was 
dismissed . . . .”). 
 108. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344–45 (2009) (holding that in 
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B. The Analogy Between DNA and Photos and Fingerprints 
Judges who believe postarrest DNA extraction is 
constitutional also draw support by placing DNA in line with 
fingerprints and photographs, routinely taken at the time of 
booking at police stations all over the country, reasoning that if 
those twentieth century standard procedures are constitutional, 
so too is the twenty-first century addition of DNA sampling. At 
first blush, the analogy between DNA—microscopic particles 
divined from our cells, capable of analysis only by computer, and 
containing the secrets of who we are and how we work—and the 
mug shot and fingerprint impressions taken as part of standard 
booking procedure, seems like “pure folly,” as it was called by the 
district court in Mitchell.109 
The Third Circuit majority in Mitchell, however, reversing 
the district court, accepted the analogy.110 It explained 
fingerprints are used to identify an arrestee, fingerprinting of all 
arrestees at booking is endorsed universally, and DNA taken at 
the time of arrest is “used only for identification purposes,” thus 
the DNA sample taken after arrest is properly viewed as 
“fingerprints for the 21st century.”111 Arrestees have argued even 
the junk DNA used to create database profiles can reveal familial 
characteristics, information absent from fingerprints or photos, 
but the Pool majority responded by noting because  
by definition the match [between database profile and family 
member DNA] is not perfect . . . . This seems somewhat 
analogous to a witness looking at a photograph of one person 
and stating that the perpetrator has a similar appearance 
which leads the police to show the witness photos of similar 
                                                                                                     
certain circumstances surrounding an arrest of a vehicle occupant, the arrestee 
has a lesser reasonable expectation of privacy, but once secured and out of 
reaching distance, the arrestee has a reasonable expectation of privacy, search 
of passenger compartment is unreasonable). The analogy could be drawn to 
extraction cases that once the arrestee is secured, there is no exigency requiring 
DNA extraction before a judicial determination of probable cause. 
 109. United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 608 (W.D. Pa. 2009), 
rev’d, 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 110. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 411. 
 111. Id. at 409–11; see also State v. Franklin, 76 So. 3d 423, 424–25 (La. 
2011) (considering Louisiana’s DNA extraction statute and echoing the Mitchell 
majority’s reasoning that DNA is the fingerprints of the twenty-first century). 
1466 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1443 (2013) 
looking individuals, one of whom the witness identifies as the 
perpetrator.112 
The concurrence went further, extending the similarity to 
fingerprints, which “may also correlate with certain traits.”113 While 
the concurrence was not blind to the unclear history of the 
constitutionality of fingerprinting, it asserted that “the near 
universal acceptance of the practice casts a long shadow over this 
case.”114 The Haskell majority noted “[f]ingerprinting has been 
consistently upheld as constitutional,” explained that there is a 
“clear analogy” between fingerprints and DNA, and added that DNA 
has several advantages over fingerprints: “DNA identification is 
more robust and reliable than fingerprint identification; DNA is 
more often left at crime scenes than fingerprints, thus enhancing 
DNA’s investigative efficacy; and . . . DNA contains a much broader 
range of identifying information than fingerprints . . . .”115 
The Buza court offered a detailed counter-argument setting out 
many reasons why DNA is different from fingerprints.116 The court 
took little comfort in the fact that only junk strands were used to 
create the database profile: “[S]cientific advances will undoubtedly 
increase the quantity and nature of information that can be 
extracted from that limited genetic information.”117 The dissents in 
both Mitchell and Pool echo the concern about the amount of 
information revealed in DNA.118 Even if junk DNA continued to 
reveal little information about the traits of the person from whom it 
was extracted, the state would still have the original sample, which 
“contain[s] the entire human genome, [and] which [the state’s] 
laboratory is required to collect and store.”119 DNA, unlike 
fingerprints, has “the potential for research to identify genetic 
                                                                                                     
 112. United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1221 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 113. Id. at 1230 (Lucero, J., concurring). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 116. See People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 768–70 (Ct. App. 2011). 
 117. Id. at 769. 
 118. See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 424 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (Rendell, J., dissenting) (explaining the DNA used to create the sample 
represents a “vast” amount of information about the arrestee); Pool, 621 F.3d at 
1234 (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (“DNA sampling . . . provides infinitely more 
information about an individual than fingerprints.”). 
 119. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 769. 
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causes of antisocial behavior that might be used to justify various 
crime control measures,” and DNA, unlike fingerprints, “is 
viewed by society as a process reserved exclusively for 
criminals.”120 The court pointed out that “the practice of 
fingerprinting on arrest, though routine, has never been 
subjected to Fourth Amendment analysis,” and if the state’s true 
interest in DNA is identification, fingerprinting is a much more 
effective tool, as DNA analysis can take weeks, while fingerprints 
can be run almost immediately.121 
The King majority supplemented the counter-argument laid 
out in Buza.  It explained that while the physical intrusion of a 
buccal swab is minimal, it is still greater than the intrusion of 
taking a fingerprint because it involves going inside the body 
rather than taking an impression of the outside.122 Like the Buza 
court, the King majority observed that traditional booking 
procedures have never undergone constitutional scrutiny, and 
even if those procedures are constitutional, we should not be in a 
hurry to supplement them with DNA extraction.123 The King 
majority concluded that DNA offered the potential for much more 
information about an arrestee than fingerprints, and it could “not 
turn a blind eye to the vast genetic treasure map that remains in 
the DNA sample retained by the State.”124 
The Arizona Supreme Court took a different approach to the 
analogy between DNA and fingerprints than any other court in 
considering the Arizona extraction statute in Mario W. v. 
Kaipio.125 The Mario W. court found that the intrusion required 
for a buccal swab is no greater than the intrusion required to take 
fingerprints, and found the state has a compelling interest in 
taking a DNA sample from a suspect at the time of arrest, just 
like it has a compelling interest in taking fingerprints at the time 
of booking.126 While the court found the first search, the taking of 
the sample, constitutional, it found the second search was 
                                                                                                     
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 770–72. 
 122. King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 576–77 (Md. 2012). 
 123. Id. at 577. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Mario W. v. Kaipio, 281 P.3d 476 (Ariz. 2012). 
 126. See id. at 481–82. 
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unconstitutional because the state has no compelling interest in 
processing the sample until after the suspect has either been 
adjudicated or failed to appear.127 In terms of the second search, 
the court explained, “[T]he State’s reliance on the fingerprinting 
analogy here is misplaced.”128 Fingerprints, photographs, and 
voice exemplars require only one search to be used for 
investigative purposes, but DNA requires the creation of a profile 
from the sample, and the Mario W. court found that difference 
sets it apart from traditional booking procedures.129 
C. The Effectiveness of Expungement Procedures 
As described earlier, most statutes place the burden on the 
arrestee to initiate and maintain the process of getting a DNA 
profile expunged and sample destroyed if not convicted of a 
qualifying offense.130 The assignment of the burden of 
expungement to an arrestee strikes many courts as unfair, and 
raises the specter of indefinite retention of profiles and 
samples.131 Proponents of extraction statutes respond that 
expungement exists as a way to terminate the search if the 
arrestee is not convicted of a qualifying offense and thus has a 
full reasonable expectation of privacy in his identity.132 
Opponents of extraction statutes first point out that 
expungement is not an easy process.133 Opponents also use the 
presence of expungement procedures for an entirely different 
                                                                                                     
 127. See id. at 483. 
 128. Id. at 482. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 131. See United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1237 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(Schroeder, J., dissenting) (discussing indefinite retention, which can only result 
from conviction or failure to expunge); People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 
780–83 (Ct. App. 2011) (discussing prospect of indefinite retention unless 
lengthy, complex expungement process is completed). 
 132. See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 404, 412 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (noting availability of expungement as a factor contributing to 
reasonableness of search). 
 133. See Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1068 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) 
(“Expungement is a lengthy, uncertain, and expensive process.”); Buza, 129 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d at 758 (discussing length and difficulty of expungement procedures 
under California statute). 
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purpose: to undercut claims by proponents that the primary 
function of extraction statutes is to identify arrestees.134 The logic 
of the argument is that if the primary purpose of the statutes is 
to identify defendants, there would be no expungement procedure 
because, even if the arrestee is not convicted, the interest in 
identifying the arrestee next time the arrestee is in custody 
would still exist.135 Opponents argue the primary purpose must 
instead be “to use those profiles and the information they provide 
as evidence in the prosecution and to solve additional past and 
future crimes.”136 Involvement in the crime at issue or other 
crimes is certainly information about which arrestees have a 
significant expectation of privacy, and the additional weight of 
this interest tips the totality of the circumstances scales for 
opponents in favor of unconstitutionality.137 
One court that concluded an extraction statute was 
unconstitutional articulated a separate, but related purpose the 
presence of expungement procedures served in its argument:  
[The expungement] requirement suggests that the legislature 
has determined that the state’s interest in collecting and 
storing DNA samples is outweighed by the privacy interest of 
a person who has not been convicted . . . because a person who 
has been charged is presumed innocent until proved guilty, we 
see no basis for concluding that before being convicted, a 
charged person’s privacy expectation is different from the 
privacy expectation of a person who was charged but the 
charge was dismissed or the person was found not guilty.138 
                                                                                                     
 134. See id. at 423 (Rendell, J., dissenting) (“If the Government’s real 
interest were in maintaining records of arrestees’ identities, there would be no 
need to expunge those records upon an acquittal or failure to file charges 
against the arrestee.”); Mario W. v. Kaipio, 265 P.3d 389, 408 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2011) (Norris, P.J., dissenting in part) (“If the purpose of DNA sampling was to 
establish identity, there would be no need to expunge . . . records.”), rev’d in 
part, 281 P.3d 476 (Ariz. 2012). 
 135. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 422–23 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
 136. Id. at 423. 
 137. See, e.g., id. at 424, 431 (explaining that the true purpose of 
expungement should be factored into the totality of circumstances and 
concluding the federal statute is unconstitutional). 
 138. In re Welfare of C.T.L., 922 N.W.2d 484, 491–92 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006); 
see also King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 577 (Md. 2012) 
The expungement provisions of the Act recognize the importance of a 
conviction in altering the scope and reasonableness of the expectation 
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Cast in this light, the availability of expungement reinforces the 
position of opponents that the true dividing line between those 
with a reasonable expectation of privacy in identity is not 
between ordinary citizen and arrestee, with convicts included in 
the arrestee category, but between ordinary citizen and convicts, 
with arrestees continuing to qualify as ordinary citizens until 
they are convicted.139 
D. The Use of Reasonable Force to Extract Samples 
In Friedman v. Boucher,140 a Ninth Circuit panel majority 
relied heavily on the degree of force applied by the officer taking 
the sample in finding the extraction at issue was a violation of 
the arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights: “Shackling a detainee, 
chaining him to a bench, and forcibly opening his jaw to extract a 
DNA sample without a warrant, court order, reasonable 
suspicion, or concern about facility security is a violation of the 
detainee’s clearly established rights under the Fourth 
                                                                                                     
of privacy. If an individual is not convicted of a qualifying crime or if 
the original charges are dropped, the DNA sample and DNA profile 
are destroyed. The General Assembly recognized the full scope of the 
information collected by DNA sampling and the rights of persons not 
convicted of qualifying crimes to keep this information private. This 
right should not be abrogated by the mere charging with a criminal 
offense: the arrestee’s presumption of innocence remains. 
 139. See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 421 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (Rendell, J., dissenting) (discussing the difference in expectations of 
privacy between ordinary citizens, arrestees, and convicts); United States v. 
Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1236 (9th Cir. 2010) (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (same). 
 140. See Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 860 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that restraining a suspect and forcibly extracting a DNA sample for the sole 
purpose of solving cold cases without a warrant or reasonable suspicion violated 
the Fourth Amendment). In Friedman, the suspect had been convicted of a sex 
offense in Montana, and after his release moved to Las Vegas, Nevada. Id. at 
851. In Las Vegas, he was arrested for an unrelated offense, and while in jail 
pending trial, a Las Vegas detective, authorized by a local prosecutor, forcibly 
extracted a DNA sample despite the suspect’s strenuous objection. Id. The 
suspect brought a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the trial court found the 
police officer and prosecutor were entitled to qualified immunity, so it granted 
summary judgment and the suspect appealed. Id. at 852. On appeal, the court 
found the reason given by the officials, that the DNA would be used to solve cold 
cases, did not justify the warrantless, suspicionless, forcible search, and the 
officials violated clearly established constitutional rights and thus were not 
entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 860. 
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Amendment.”141 And the Friedman majority was not merely 
worried about the extreme facts before it—it was wary of any 
position that would “endorse routine, forcible DNA extraction.”142 
The dissent in Friedman would have found the search 
constitutional143 and argued the force used was reasonable in 
light of “jailers’ concerns with security [that] extend to all 
inmates.”144 Other courts have not been troubled by the force 
used in the extraction in Friedman.145 In Pool, a Ninth Circuit 
case decided after Friedman, the majority offered three principle 
reasons why the federal extraction statute could be upheld 
despite the result in Friedman: there was a judicial 
determination of probable cause, Pool had been arrested for a 
qualifying offense (as opposed to the unrelated offense that 
landed Friedman in the jail where extraction took place), and 
Nevada offered no statutory authority for the extraction in 
Friedman,146 unlike in Pool, in which the Government relied on 
the DNA Act.147 
IV. The Reasons for DNA Extraction from Arrestees 
This Note has considered similarities and differences 
between the federal and state DNA extraction statutes and the 
major points of contention among courts for and against the 
statutes. The arguments put forth by proponents and opponents 
of the statutes are well reasoned, but at this point it is necessary 
to place those arguments in context by taking a step back and 
looking at the purposes served by DNA extraction at the time of 
                                                                                                     
 141. Id. at 860. 
 142. Id. at 857. 
 143. See id. at 867 (Callahan, J., dissenting) (“I would find, that an in-
custody repeat sex offender, like Friedman, does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment to prevent state 
authorities from using a buccal swab to take a DNA sample.”). 
 144. Id. at 865. 
 145. See United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1224–25 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(distinguishing Friedman). 
 146. Nevada does not have a state statute that allows extraction of DNA 
from arrestees—it only allows samples to be taken from those convicted of 
qualifying offenses. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.0913 (West 2011). 
 147. Pool, 621 F.3d at 1224–25. 
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arrest, before offering suggestions as to how a legislature should 
approach composing an extraction statute. 
The primary purpose in extracting DNA from arrestees, as 
described above, is identification of the person police have in 
custody.148 Knowing the identity of an arrestee in custody is 
important for several reasons. First, it will let police and 
prosecutors know with whom they are dealing.149 An arrestee 
with prior convictions has a strong interest in obscuring his 
identity at apprehension, and extracting a DNA sample and 
running it through state and national databases will reduce the 
likelihood the attempt will be successful, and police will know the 
arrestee’s criminal history. Most immediately, police and 
prosecutors will know if the arrestee is wanted elsewhere.150 If 
the arrestee is wanted elsewhere, the arresting jurisdiction can 
begin to make arrangements with the other jurisdiction(s) to 
determine which one will try the arrestee first and arrange 
extradition if necessary. Running the sample through CODIS 
may also reveal a criminal history previously unknown to law 
enforcement by generating a match with a sample from a cold 
case.151 
If the arrestee is staying in the arresting jurisdiction, the 
prosecutor, armed with the true identity and criminal history of 
the arrestee, will form a position as to whether “the individual 
may be released pending trial without endangering society and 
ensuring that he or she complies with the conditions of his or her 
release.”152 The Supreme Court has established that the 
                                                                                                     
 148. See, e.g., id. at 1222 (describing the principal government interest in 
DNA extraction as identification). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 706 (Va. 2007) (listing 
the determination of wanted status elsewhere as a legitimate interest of 
government in knowing identity of arrestee) (citing 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.3(c) (4th ed. 2004)).  
 151. See id. at 704 (describing arrest of defendant for an unrelated 
qualifying offense, sample was take pursuant to statute, sample matched that 
taken from rape victim in stalled investigation); see also United States v. 
Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 414 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“The second component [of 
an arrestee’s identity]—what a person has done—can have important pretrial 
ramifications. Running an arrestee’s DNA profile through CODIS could reveal 
matches to crime-scene DNA samples from unsolved cases.”). 
 152. United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1233 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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“government’s interest in preventing crime by arrestees [released 
before trial] is both legitimate and compelling.”153 Further, 
knowledge of the criminal history of an arrestee will better enable 
police after arrest, and corrections officials if the arrestee is kept 
in custody prior to trial, to take appropriate measures to ensure 
security in the jail or prison.154 Even the Buza court, in finding 
the California extraction statute unconstitutional, conceded the 
strength of these identification interests.155 
Opponents of DNA extraction statutes argue that the need 
for identification is already met by taking fingerprints and 
comparing them to the state and national fingerprint 
databases.156 DNA, however, has several advantages over 
fingerprints, one of which is that “fingerprint patterns cannot be 
converted into numerical data that can be searched as efficiently 
as DNA data.”157 Another advantage is that “the absolute 
certainty [of fingerprints] has been proved wrong in the past.”158 
A fingerprint can be distorted or incomplete, leading to many 
potential matches.159 A prominent example of mistaken 
fingerprint identification is the story of Brandon Mayfield, an 
Army veteran who became a lawyer and was arrested after a 
“match” of his fingerprint turned up on evidence from the 2004 
Madrid terror bombings, despite Mayfield having not left the 
                                                                                                     
 153. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987). 
 154. See Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 865 (2009) (Callahan, J., 
dissenting) (“[J]ailers’ concerns with security extend to all inmates . . . .”). 
 155. See People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 761 (Ct. App. 2011) (“[T]he 
government has a strong interest in identifying and prosecuting offenders and, 
in the case of those on supervised release, promoting rehabilitation and 
protecting the community.”). 
 156. See, e.g., Preston, supra note 1, at 486 (explaining fingerprinting is a 
foolproof way of determining identity while giving the government far less 
information about the arrestee than a DNA sample). 
 157. D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 455, 489 (2001). 
 158. State v. Rose, No. K06-0545, 2007 WL 4358047, at *25 (Md. Cir. Ct. 
Oct. 19, 2007) (excluding fingerprint evidence from capital trial on Frye grounds 
due to lack of reliability). 
 159. See Weighing Fingerprints as Forensic Evidence, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 
2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-3445_162-4069140.html?tag=contentMain; 
contentBody (last visited Apr. 7, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
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United States in a decade.160 Mayfield was eventually cleared, 
but the incident led the FBI to reevaluate their fingerprint 
identification system.161 Even a small sample of blood, saliva, or 
tissue, however, can be enough to create a DNA profile, and a 
match to that profile is “nearly unassailable evidence of 
identity.”162 While a criminal may be able to thwart the collection 
of fingerprint evidence by wearing gloves, “it is much more 
difficult for a perpetrator not to leave some DNA evidence at the 
scene of a crime.”163 
Individual identification may be the primary reason DNA is 
extracted, but it is far from the only reason. Another reason is to 
prevent future crimes.164 Prevention of future crimes is related to 
the previous discussion of identification—DNA extraction can 
prevent future crimes by correctly and fully identifying the 
arrestee and his criminal history so that a dangerous arrestee is 
either not released prior to trial or is effectively supervised.165 
DNA can also be used to form profiles of repeat offenders in 
databases as samples from the same person are recovered at 
multiple crime scenes.166 From these suspect profiles, crime 
patterns can be analyzed, and police become more likely to 
apprehend a suspect before the next crime is committed, which is 
especially valuable when a budding criminal can be stopped 
before minor crimes escalate to major crimes.167 The DNA itself 
                                                                                                     
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Elizabeth E. Joh, Essay, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth 
Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 876 (2006); see also 
Julie A. Singer et al., The Impact of DNA and Other Technology on the Criminal 
Justice System: Improvements and Complications, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 87, 
96 (2007) (“DNA tests affect legal outcomes by providing certainty about identity 
in a way that has not been possible before.”). 
 163. United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1222 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 164. See Robert Molko, The Perils of Suspicionless DNA Extraction of 
Arrestees under California Proposition 69: Liability of the California Prosecutor 
for Fourth Amendment Violation? The Uncertainty Continues in 2010, 37 W. ST. 
U. L. REV. 183, 187 (2010) (identifying one of the benefits of DNA extraction 
from arrestees as preventing future crimes). 
 165. See id. at 187–88 (discussing studies done in Chicago and Denver, both 
of which revealed crimes committed by arrestees released before trial based on 
incomplete information in the hands of the prosecutor or judge). 
 166. See Singer, supra note 162, at 102. 
 167. Id. at 102–03. 
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does not provide this information, but if matching DNA is found 
at three gas station robberies in the same neighborhood, police 
can stake out the fourth gas station and apprehend the suspect in 
the course of the next robbery. An example of the extra value 
would be if a subsequent search of the gas-station robber’s 
apartment revealed he and his gang decided the real money was 
in kidnapping and ransoming children of wealthy individuals, 
and that was going to be their next crime. DNA extraction can 
also have a deterrent effect, leading an arrestee released before 
trial to think twice before resuming criminal activity or starting 
any new endeavor for fear his DNA will be discovered and used to 
enhance the pending charges.168 
A final purpose for the extraction of DNA is to exonerate the 
innocent.169 In a different context, the Supreme Court has made 
clear “the community has a real interest in [searches that] may 
yield necessary evidence for the solution and prosecution of 
crime, evidence that may insure that a wholly innocent person is 
not wrongly charged with a criminal offense.”170 When an 
arrestee’s sample is analyzed, it may reveal the arrestee is not 
the person the police are looking for (police thought they arrested 
John Smith, DNA reveals they arrested Jon Smythe), or that the 
arrestee did not commit the crime in question (DNA recovered at 
the scene does not match), or that the arrestee actually 
committed a crime for which an innocent person is on trial or 
serving time.171 
                                                                                                     
 168. See Pool, 621 F.3d at 1223 (“The collection of a DNA sample . . . 
discourages a defendant from violating any condition of his or her pretrial 
release.”). 
 169. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 839 n.38 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(“CODIS promptly clears thousands of potential suspects . . . .”). 
 170. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 243 (1973) (discussing 
consent searches). 
 171. Cf. United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 414–15 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (“Collecting DNA samples from arrestees can speed both the investigation 
of the crime of arrest and the solution for any past crime for which there is a 
match in CODIS.”). 
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V. Evaluation of DNA Extraction Statute Ingredients 
In preceding Parts, this Note has considered the DNA 
extraction statutes crafted by Congress and every state 
legislature, the reception these efforts have received in federal 
and state courts, and the reasons why DNA is taken from 
arrestees. With all this in mind, it is possible to offer guidance to 
a legislature evaluating its DNA extraction statute and seeking 
to immunize the statute from constitutional challenge. This Note 
will offer the benefit and possible risk (i.e., the risk that inclusion 
of a particular ingredient will lead to a finding of 
unconstitutionality) of various ingredients, but it will stop short 
of proposing a model statute. Investigation of the federal and 
state statutes has revealed one thing clearly: every legislature 
weighs its own peculiar mix of needs and concerns in drafting a 
statute. Every jurisdiction has its own mix of crime control, 
arrestee protection, and financial concerns that go into statutory 
construction. There simply is no one-size-fits-all suggestion that 
would be of any practical use. 
To begin, a statute will certainly be constitutional if it 
chooses to limit DNA extraction to convicted felons, as many 
states have chosen to do.172 This is a perfectly legitimate choice 
given the budgetary priorities of a jurisdiction, and it is sure to 
be upheld because all courts to consider the issue agree that 
individuals convicted of qualifying offenses have a lesser 
reasonable expectation of privacy, enabling the government to 
use DNA to supervise their release.173 
If, however, a legislature desires to expand the statute to 
cover arrestees, that choice, in and of itself, will not invalidate 
the statute.174 The government has a substantial interest in 
identifying arrestees,175 DNA is a very good way to do 
                                                                                                     
 172. See id. at 405 (“Ultimately [all circuits] likewise concluded that the 
collection of DNA samples from prisoners or probationers is a reasonable search 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 173. See id. 
 174. See People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729, 782 (Ct. App. 2011) 
(analyzing the California DNA extraction statute not as invalid on its face, but 
invalid as applied to an arrestee who has yet to have a judicial determination of 
probable cause). 
 175. See, e.g., United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1222 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(describing the principal government interest in DNA extraction as 
YOU’RE UNDER ARREST 1477 
that,176 and extraction at arrest is not in itself unconstitutional 
because even courts striking down statutes allowing extraction at 
arrest acknowledge those interests and would uphold a statute if 
privacy interests were protected enough to tip the scales in favor 
of constitutionality.177 
If a legislature chooses to take advantage of the (perhaps 
quite substantial) benefits that will accompany DNA extraction 
from arrestees,178 the most important ingredient to provide in a 
statute is a waiting period until a neutral arbiter has found 
probable cause. Courts that have upheld the federal statutes have 
emphasized that in the cases before them, extraction was not 
sought until after probable cause had been determined,179 and in 
two of the state-court cases to invalidate statutes, courts focused 
on the absence of a judicial determination of probable cause.180 To 
explain the emphasis reviewing courts place on the finding of 
probable cause by a judge or grand jury, one may look to the text 
of the Fourth Amendment itself, which specifically mentions 
probable cause,181 and years of precedent valuing the 
                                                                                                     
identification). 
 176. See Joh, supra note 162, at 876 (explaining DNA provides nearly 
unassailable evidence of identity). 
 177. See Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 761 (explaining government interest in 
identification is important, utilizing totality of the circumstances balancing test, 
but ultimately finding individual interests outweighed government interests in 
California’s statute). 
 178. See supra Part IV. 
 179. See Pool, 621 F.3d at 1232 (Lucero, J., concurring) (“The first point, 
which the majority states in no uncertain terms but which bears repeating, is 
that this case condones DNA testing for individuals for whom a judicial or grand 
jury determination of probable cause determination has been made; it does not 
address such sampling from mere arrestees.”); United States v. Mitchell, 652 
F.3d 387, 412 n.22 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (reserving question of whether DNA 
could be extracted from arrestees for whom there has been no judicial or grand 
jury determination of probable cause). 
 180. See People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729, 766 (Ct. App. 2011) 
(describing the extraction of a sample from arrestee before judicial or grand jury 
determination of probable cause as involving a “more extreme” circumstance 
than Pool or Mitchell); In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484, 492 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2006) (invalidating extraction statute for taking sample without 
magistrate’s determination of probable cause for search). 
 181. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause . . . .”). 
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interpretation of evidence by “a neutral and detached magistrate 
instead of . . . the officer engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime.”182 The additional burden that 
waiting will place on the police is minimal—any warrantless 
arrest already requires “a timely determination of probable 
cause,”183 and that determination must come within forty-eight 
hours.184 If a legislature feels strongly enough about wanting to 
take the sample at the time of booking, such a position is not per 
se unconstitutional, but it certainly places statutes at a great risk 
of being deemed unconstitutional. 
One feature that all extraction statutes share is a procedure 
for expungement. The differences between various state 
expungement regimes was explored at length earlier, and both 
proponents and opponents of DNA extraction of arrestees have 
used the presence of expungement to support their argument.185 
The features of a given expungement regime have seemed to 
matter little to courts considering the constitutionality of the 
overall legislative scheme, but the concern of courts with 
“indefinite retention” of samples186 suggests adopting a pro-
arrestee expungement regime would better insulate a given 
statute from constitutional challenge. It would seem that a 
procedure that resulted in profiles being deleted and samples 
being destroyed after a certain period of time barring 
intervention from the state187 would be the best way to mollify 
courts concerned with indefinite retention, but a statute with just 
such a procedure was recently found unconstitutional.188 Another 
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element of an expungement process that would protect a scheme 
from constitutional challenge is the approach adopted by four 
states of providing notice to an arrestee at the time the sample is 
taken,189 given the emphasis the Supreme Court has placed on 
sufficiency of notice in other contexts.190 The Supreme Court will 
get a chance to weigh in on this issue because the Maryland 
statute invalidated by the King court also contained a notice 
provision.191 
One factor that should be left out of extraction statutes to 
ensure they survive constitutional challenge is a provision 
authorizing use of reasonable force to obtain the sample. The 
majority of the Ninth Circuit panel in Friedman focused heavily 
on the facts surrounding the extraction of the sample from the 
arrestee, and though most officers taking samples will have no 
impure motive, as long as reasonable force is allowed more sets of 
facts will be generated like those in Friedman, putting an 
extraction regime on potentially shaky ground from the first page 
of an opinion. 
A legislature may worry that in the real world of the station 
house or county jail, many arrestees will not cooperate, and 
without reasonable force the legislature deprives itself of a 
valuable stick to encourage cooperation. Twelve states that allow 
post-arrest extraction, however, make no mention of reasonable 
force in their statutes and have been able to make the system 
work. To make sure the state gains the benefits of DNA 
extraction in the face of an uncooperative arrestee, a legislature 
can provide a framework like that adopted by Vermont, in which 
a judge determines if a sample needs to be taken and can give 
neutral authorization to use force when confronted by a stubborn 
arrestee.192  
All extraction statutes have in common provisions setting out 
qualifying offenses, determining whether both juveniles and 
adults will be required to give samples, and other details of 
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expungement. These features are highly dependent on the unique 
needs of the state, and because reviewing courts have yet to 
involve any of these features in analysis of an extraction statute, 
a legislature can feel free to choose any option that fits its unique 
needs with little risk that option will lead to a finding of 
unconstitutionality. 
VI. Conclusion 
All legislatures take seriously the protection of citizens, one 
of the foremost functions of any government. The potential value 
of DNA in aiding law enforcement cannot be underestimated: “[I]t 
is one of the more transformative developments that have taken 
place in recent legal history.”193 One way legislatures have sought 
to take advantage of the increased knowledge of the human 
genome is extracting DNA at the time of arrest. Extraction of 
DNA at the time of arrest for qualifying offenses has been 
adopted by twenty-three states, and fifteen more are currently 
considering adopting such legislation. Arrestees have challenged 
this practice, and courts have duly begun a task with which they 
are very familiar—trying to reconcile advancing technology with 
the fundamental interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
Some challenges have been successful, and some potential 
flaws in the statutes have been brought to light, but legislatures 
should be undeterred in their use of a new technology of limitless 
promise to protect their citizens.194 This does not mean 
legislatures should rush headlong into uncharted territory. 
Legislatures should heed guidance from reviewing courts and 
incorporate prevailing views into statutes to ensure maximum 
protection of both citizen security and individual rights, and 
avoid disruption in the procedures of law enforcement by passing 
statutes and creating procedures only to have them swiftly struck 
from the books. This Note has attempted a close look at the 
guidance from courts so far, and though courts have split into 
camps as to whether current arrestee extraction statutes are 
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constitutional, the guidance on how to make such statutes 
constitutional seems clear. It should be noted, however, that this 
guidance is almost certainly incomplete. While the Third Circuit 
weighed in en banc in Mitchell just last year, the Ninth Circuit, 
the judges of which had diverse and intelligent views on the 
interplay of DNA extraction and the Constitution in approving 
DNA extraction from convicts,195 was ready to hear Pool en banc 
until the appellant’s guilty plea mooted the case.196 Now the 
United States Supreme Court is set to weigh in.197 
Statutes should provide that a sample can only be extracted 
after a judicial or grand jury determination of probable cause, 
expungement procedures should place the burden of the process 
on the state, not the arrestee, notice should be given of 
expungement procedures, and reasonable force should be used to 
extract a sample only as a last resort and with the blessing of a 
magistrate. Statutes tailored in this way should address the 
concerns of opponents and allow law enforcement to extract DNA 
at the time of arrest and use the power of genetics to determine 
exactly who an arrestee is, bringing to justice the criminals that 
are hardest to catch and exonerating the innocent. 
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